"Smith's lectures on Jurisprudence were a tour de force. His clear views on liberty made clear the impartiality of justice and contributed to 18 th century constitutional theory" (Gavin Kennedy 2005:83).
treatment appears in the Lectures on Jurisprudence, it is relatively unknown. Better known for his work on economics and moral theory, Adam Smith's constitutional theory is often overlooked. A substantial portion of this theory appears in Smith's work on jurisprudence or government, law, and politics. Despite promising in 1759 to produce a book on this topic, Smith never published this work, and it may well have been among the manuscripts he had burned just before he died over three decades later in 1790. 2 We nonetheless know something of his ideas from two sets of student notes on his Lectures on Jurisprudence given at the University of Glasgow (which Smith delivered from the early 1750s through the mid-1760s). The Lectures -in combination with elements from the Wealth of Nations -provide us with evidence that Smith had a rich constitutional theory, as two of the classic studies of Smith's jurisprudence attest (Winch 1983:255; 1978:ch4 and Haakonssen 1981:127-33) . Both studies argue that the Lectures remain under-examined, an observation that still holds today.
The central elements of Smith's constitutional theory help us understand the importance of his contribution in political economy. Too often Smith's views are reduced to an argument supporting minimal government (Friedman 1977 , Stigler 1975 see Liu 2017:ch4) .
Modern day economists often give lip-service to the enforcement of contracts and property rights, but economics possesses no theory explaining how the government provides this essential market infrastructure (despite the best efforts of North 1981 North , 1990 . Instead most economic approaches to markets implicitly assume a government that simply does so. This common view suffers from the neoclassical fallacy (Weingast 2016) ; namely, that free markets can exist without government. Most economic models implicitly assume all the elements of what Smith labeled, "liberty": security from violence; property rights and contract enforcement, and protection from government predation. Universally in today's developed world, governments provide this market infrastructure; and no market economy exists without it (see Besley and Persson 2009, 2012 , who call this market infrastructure "state-capacity").
One of Smith's principal concerns in his jurisprudence is the "wealth of nations": why are some countries rich while most remain poor? Smith mentions again and again that people subject to predation and violence have little incentive to produce (cites/ quotes). For example:
In the infancey of society, as has been often observed, government must be weak and feeble, and it is long before it's authority can protect the industry of individuals from the rapacity of their neighbours. When people find themselves every moment in danger of being robbed of all they possess, they have no motive to be industrious. There could be little accumulation of stock, because the indolent, which would be the greatest number, would live upon the industrious, and spend whatever they produced. Nothing can be more an obstacle to the progress of opulence (LJ(B) 522).
In discussing the violent feudal era, Smith says:
[M]en in this defenceless state naturally content themselves with their necessary subsistence; because to acquire more might only tempt the injustice of their oppressors (WN III.iii.12:405; see also II.i:31:285).
Smith's characterization of the no-growth feudal era in which most people lived at subsistence shows the importance of liberty, especially freedom from violence, secure property rights to capture the returns on investment, and the absence of government predation. "Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law" (WN V.iii.7:910) . Smith sought to understand how these elements of market infrastructure could be sustained. He addresses this question in several different ways in his corpus; for example, explaining in Book III, the least read and least understood portion of the Wealth of Nations, how feudalism was a long-term, no-growth equilibrium and how commerce and the growth of long-distance trade emerged out of this equilibrium (see Weingast 2017a).
3 In this paper, I focus on Smith's relatively unknown constitutional theory which provides another component of his answer.
Modern political-economic theorists of development have recently begun to catch up with Smith in the sense that they study pieces of Smith's emphasis on liberty. Hont and Ignatief (1983:12) epitomize this view: "The 'system of natural liberty' which Smith advocated … had the normative purpose of guaranteeing the economic conditions of competition necessary for the enforcement of common rules of propriety in market relations" (citing WN IV.iii.c.9; I.x.c.27; I.x.p.10). Besley and Persson (2011) emphasize the importance of state-capacity to tax, enforce property rights, and provide public goods (see also Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) . Weingast (1995) highlights the "economic role of political institutions" in the prevention of government predation.
McCloskey (2016a,b) summarizes what's needed by the ideas of liberty and equality.
While Dixit (2004) and North, Wallis, and Weingast (2016) emphasize that markets require the control of violence, a topic about which we know too little.
Smith's constitutional theory demonstrates both the reasons why this market infrastructure is necessary for thriving markets of the commercial economy; and how to design a government capable of sustaining this market infrastructure. Smith also 3 Smith also studies the question of how liberty emerged in the feudal world, both through the rise of towns (which escaped the no-growth, feudal equilibrium) and the demise of the Catholic Church's monopoly on religious services. I study Smith's ideas on these topics in Weingast (2017a Weingast ( , 2017b respectively. This paper focuses on the constitutional institutions necessary to sustain liberty in a polity that has established it.
explained why politics-specifically, constitutional government capable of sustaining liberty-had to develop in parallel with the market society.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Smith's constitutional theory provides a normative theory of citizen rights embedded in a positive approach to political institutions. Smith's theory addresses the question of how to structure the institutions of public decisionmaking sufficiently strong and capable of providing market infrastructure while protecting citizens against state predation. Smith's jurisprudence, inter alia, integrates his understanding of the political and legal foundations of markets.
Many different discussions across Smith's work bear directly on this topic.
4
In this paper, I focus on the component of Smith's jurisprudence reflected in constitutional theory or public law; that is, his theory explaining the institutions that sustain liberty, commerce, and security. I follow Winch (1983:257) who argues that the main oversight among economic studies of Smith "lies in the failure to appreciate the complex reciprocal relationship which Smith established between economy and polity, between commerce and liberty… Even when imperfectly realized, liberty defined as personal security under the rule of law was a precondition for commercial advance." 5 Smith's constitutional theory is less well-known than that of Locke, Montesquieu, and Madison. Nonetheless, as I argue below, Smith's contributions to this tradition equal that of these other more well-known theorists, especially with respect to explaining constitutional sources of incentives of public opinion to provide market infrastructure, 4 Other topics include (i) Smith's four-stages theory about the nature of government and legal system associated with each of the four stages of the means of subsistence -hunter-gatherer, pastoral, agricultural, and commercial; (ii) the violent, low-growth, but stable feudal system and the escape from this system by the towns; and (iii) explanation for the market-hindering role of the medieval Catholic Church. In two companion papers, I study Smith's discussions on (ii) and (iii) in Weingast (2017a) and Weingast (2017b) respectively.
5 Hont makes the same point: A "distinctive feature of Smith's history is that he clearly made a determined effort to relate the development of both law and government to economic development" Hont (2009:148) . such as secure property rights and barriers to tyranny, predation, and arbitrary power (Haakonssen 1981:127-33; Kennedy 2005:81) . This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces Smith's approach to public law, including a discussion of Smith's views on the problems that a constitution must solve. Section 3 summarizes aspects of Smith's prescriptive aspects of a constitution, while section 4 discusses the intimate connection between the separation of powers and other constitutional devices. In section 5-6, I study Smith's argument about how constitutions are enforced. Section 7 discusses how the many components of Smith's constitutional theory add up to a coherent whole, while section 8 compares Smiths ideas with those of Locke, Montesquieu, and Madison. My conclusions follow.
Adam Smith's Constitutional Theory: the Problems Constitutions Must Solve
Smith divides his constitutional theory or "public law" into two parts, the rights of the sovereign relative to the citizens; and the rights of citizens relative to the sovereign. 7 In Smith's well-known discussion of the three duties of the sovereign in WN Book IV, two involve violence: "first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice" (WN IV.ix.51:687). Smith's third duty is to provide market-enhancing public goods, such as infrastructure. A third problem to be solved can be posed in several ways, namely, the problem of the arbitrary abuse of power, or -in modern terms -of executive moral hazard (Besley 2006 ) and government predation (Shleifer and Vishny 1998) . Referring to this problem, Smith observed that, "When people find themselves every moment in danger of being robbed of all they possess, they have no motive to be industrious. There could be little accumulation of stock… Nothing can be more an obstacle to the progress of opulence" (LJ(B) 522). Smith analyzes an example of executive moral hazard in detail, among others. When the executive also serves as judge, he is unlikely to take an impartial view of cases in which he has a direct interest:
When the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible that justice should not frequently be sacrificed to, what is vulgarly called, politics. The persons entrusted with the great interests of the state may, even without any corrupt views, sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those interests the rights of a private man. But upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, the sense which he has of his own security. In order to make every individual feel himself perfectly secure in the possession of every right which belongs to him, it is not only necessary that the judicial should be separated from the executive power, but that it should be rendered as much as possible independent of that power .
result societies would have to develop some conflict resolution mechanism if such disputes were not to tear the society apart" (Smith 2006:55, citing LJ(A) iv.9-11:203) .
A necessary condition, therefore, for the rule of law is that the judiciary be independent of the executive. A final problem raised by Smith concerns stability of the overall constitutional system. To be sustained, a constitution must provide the means and incentives for political officials and citizens to honor its provisions. In today's world, most new constitutions fail, and in short order (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009; Mittal and Weingast 2011) . The ever-present conflicts in early modern Europe suggest that the failure of new regimes is not just a recent problem. In the mid-18 th century, few states had a constitution in the sense of a stable set of rules governing public institutions and citizen rights. Smith attended this problem in several ways.
Prescriptive Elements of Smith's Constitutional Theory
I begin with Kennedy's (2005:81- 
Further Elements
Following accepted practice, Smith distinguishes between private law (e.g., property or contract law) and public law (e.g., structure of the constitution, the allocation of various powers to specific entities, such as the judiciary, and a set of citizen rights).
He observes that private law is logically developed, precise, and characterized by well-established precedents. In contrast, public law is unclear, lacking in precedents and attended by force and violence (LJ(A) v 103-04:311). Haakonssen (1981:128) Smith argues that sovereign power grew over time as the state developed. He accounts for this growth in power by two different principles (Hont 2009:139) . The first principle is authority, which arises from natural deference to one's superiors. Smith likens this source of sovereign power to habitual obedience, as a son to a father. He also associated this principle with Toryism in British politics (Haakonssen 1981:128 ).
Smith's second principle is utility: the idea that people support the sovereign in part because the sovereign produces value, such as security and independence for each individual. Smith associated this principle with Whiggism in British politics (Haakonssen 1981:128) . The first principle predominates in monarchies; the second, in republics. The politics of late 17 th and early to mid-18 th century Britain separated the two principles.
David Hume, one of Smith's dearest friends and a major political theorist of the era, "'loathed'" even mild forms of authority.
Yet Smith was preoccupied with authority (see, e.g., Hont 2009:146) . First, authority was necessary to secure justice; but to work as part of a developed commercial society, authority had to be constrained, especially executive moral hazard by which rulers abused the trust invested in them by the people. Securing justice, therefore, required institutions that provided the monarch with incentives to honor the law. A necessary step toward this goal involved disassociating the principle of authority from the Tory doctrine of passive obedience to the monarch and from Filmer's ideas about divine right of kings (Hont 2009:142) . Following Hume, Smith rejected the idea that authority emerged through a social contract.
12 Winch (1983:257) observes that an important strand in the economic literature on
Smith involves the "naively economistic position" that economic liberalism was merely an instrumental argument to favor economic efficiency and long-term growth. "Whatever modern economists may say about such matters, Smith cannot be treated as a mere economic instrumentalist; he was advancing far more ambitious claims" (Winch (1983:257) . Winch advocates that Smith understood the relationship between economy and polity, but also between commerce and liberty as complex and reciprocal (see also Winch 1978, ch 4) . According to Winch, "Smith provided us with an historical and economic analysis of this relationship, and used it as the basis for his recommendations for bringing economic and political institutions into harmony with one another." As quoted above, Winch adds that even imperfect "liberty defined as personal security under the rule of law was a precondition for commercial advance." Economists studying Smith tend to ignore or dismiss Smith's historical and jurisprudential arguments
13
; and 12 Smith also provides several reasons for rejecting the idea of a social contract (Haakonssen 1981:129, citing LJ(A) v, 114-19, 127-28; LJ(B) 15-18, 93-96) . Such a contract had never happened. And even if it did, it would not bind successor generations. Further, Smith observed that this idea is peculiarly British. Were such a contract to have occurred, Smith argued, political theorists from other countries would have written about it as well.
13 For example, most economists studying the history of economic thought dismiss WN Book III (as Winch observes 1983,258) . See, e.g., Blaug (1978) , Brue and Grant (2007:**) , and Robbins (1998:**) . Although yet Smith elaborated many of his theoretical ideas about jurisprudence as part of his historical narratives. Winch (1979:96) makes an important Smithian observation about the separation of powers system; namely, that it extends the division of labor to the public sphere. Dividing governmental powers into separate parts addresses the moral hazard problem. A judiciary independent of the executive reduces the problem of executive and judicial moral hazard. Granting the parliament exclusive control over legislation and especially taxation also reduces executive moral hazard. In particular, the monarch is Schumpeter (1954,187) observed that "This third Book did not attract the attention it seems to merit," he devotes only two other sentences to it. Skinner (1975 Skinner ( , 1996 is an obvious exception.
The Separation of Powers and Other Constitutional Devices
far less likely to initiate unpopular wars when parliament holds the purse strings (Rosenthal 1998) . Moreover, the economic principle of "willingness-to-pay" from public finance (cites) applies here; the people and their parliamentary representatives are more willing to finance wars and other public goods from which they perceive benefits than wars and expenditures that they view as harmful.
Smith views the separation of powers as a system of mutual restraints. These ideas are familiar given the immense influence of the Federalist Papers; but we need remember that Smith's discussion antedates these papers by a quarter-century. The Monarch in Smith's prescriptive system has no legislative or judicial powers.
Nonetheless, the monarch holds powers that can constrain parliament; namely, it may veto legislation and prorogue parliament.
14 Parliament may pass laws (for example, limiting judicial discretion by announcing rules of conduct deemed illegal); it holds the power to grant or withhold taxes to the monarch; and it may impeach the monarch's ministers (for example, for failing to execute the laws). Finally, the Judiciary may constrain the monarch (for example, by ruling that the monarch possesses -or fails to possess -particular powers). Taken together, these components represent a system of mutual and interlocking constraints. Smith pursues the theme of fiscal incentives on constitutional stability in the Lectures. He argued that Elizabeth I, "always affected popularity [and] was continually unwilling to impose taxes on her subjects. In order to supply her exigences she sold the royal demesnes, as she knew that none of her offspring was to succeed her. Her successors therefore standing in need of frequent supplies were obliged to make application to Parliaments" (LJ(B) 61:420-21). As North and Weingast (1989) observe, selling off major portions of revenue-producing assets to meet current spending obligation is akin to a firm going bankrupt. Following Elizabeth's death, the new Stuart kings faced difficult fiscal deficit problems; these difficulties gave Parliament a bargaining advantage with which to constrain the king. In the late seventeenth century, fiscal problems were worse for James II, and "forced [him] to quit the throne and the kingdom altogether" during the Glorious Revolution (LJ(B) 62:421).
As part of the revolution, Parliament granted the new monarchs of William and
Mary considerably more revenue than it had to the Stuarts, but it also imposed greater constraints. After noting that previous monarchs had alienated the royal demesnes so that these lands no longer served as a source of revenue, Smith reports that the crown's revenue fell into three categories, each subject to constitutional constraints. First, the Civil List maintained the royal family and therefore afforded little opportunity to "endanger the liberty of the nation." Second the malt and land taxes, granted annually "depend entirely on the Parliament." Third, various funds serve to mortgage the public debt, including taxes on salt, beer, and malt. This revenue flows to the Court of Exchequer and is entirely out of reach by the crown; the Exchequer can pay only to those sources appointed by Parliament (LJ(B) 62-63:421). Smith concludes that, since the revolution:
[T]he nation is quite secure in the management of the public revenue, and in this manner a rational system of liberty has been introduced into Brittain. The Parliament consists of about 200 peers and 500 commoners. The Commons in a great measure manage all public affairs, as no money bill can take its rise except in that House. Here is a happy mixture of all the different forms of government properly restrained and a perfect security to liberty and property (LJ(B) 63:421).
Enforcing Constitutional Provisions: The Right of Resistance
But how are these constitutional prescriptions to be enforced? The division of powers is of no consequence if political openness ignore it. As with his predecessors - with them in all their plots and conspiracys to turn them out, is rejoiced at their success, and grieves when they fail" (LJ(A) v 125-26:320). With respect to the principle of utility, Smith says that "obedience is no longer due than it is usefull" (LJ(A) v 126, 320). In short, "Absurdity and impropriety of conduct and great perverseness destroy obedience, whether it be due from authority or the sense of the common good" (LJ(A) v 127, 321).
The sovereign may be resisted, but great difficulties hinder this mechanism since there exists no regular authority for doing so. Worse, no laws, precedents, or judges exist that can make authoritative pronouncements so that a sovereign who violates the constitution may be resisted. It is worth quoting Smith at length on this mechanism:
"tho the sovereign may be resisted, it cant be said that there is any regular authority for so doing. The property, life, and liberty of the subject are in some measure in his power… No laws, no judges, have or can ascertain this matter, nor formed any precedents whereby we may judge" (LJ(A) v 138:325).
[T]here is no court which can try the sovereigns themselves, no authority sovereign to the sovereign, and which has examind and ascertaind how far the actions of the sovereigns to the subject or of one sovereign to another are justifiable and how far their power extends. The precise limits have been little considered and are very difficult to ascertain to which the power of the sovereign extends.
Historically,
[a]ll disputes of this sort have been decided by force and violence. If the sovereign got the better of the subjects, then they were condemned as traitors and rebells; and if the subjects have got the better of the sovereign, he is declared to be a tyrant and oppressor not to be endured. Sometimes the decision has been right and sometimes wrong, but they can never be of such weight as the decisions of a cooll and impartial court" (LJ(A) v 103-04).
The circumstances under which the sovereign can be judged as having violated the constitution are vague and difficult to use. By itself, the right of resistance on the sovereign is unlikely to be effective. Smith solves this problem in an ingenious manner.
The Right of Resistance as an Incentive System
As observed, Smith agreed with Hobbes that sovereignty is absolute. Unlike Hobbes, Smith applied this logic solely to the sovereign as a whole; that is, to the king, legislature, and judiciary acting in concert. In contrast to Hobbes -and presaging Madison in Federalist 51 -Smith asserts that the component parts of the sovereign can be held to rules and regular law. Specifically, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches can each be held accountable for violating the prescribed limits on its powers.
"If one branch trespasses on the area entrusted to one of the others, this will constitute an infringement of the right of the latter, which can therefore 'with all justice and equity' defend its right, even by force" (Haakonssen, 1981:130; citing LJ(B) it is easy to ascertain when any of those amongst whom [sovereignty] is divided go beyond their lawfull bounds; for this is the case whenever any one of them attempts to exercise the power which belongs to another, as if the Parliament or king should act in the legislative way without the consent of the other, if the Parliament should make war or the king endeavour to raise taxes. The king can indeed remedy any unjust proceedings of the Parliament by proroguing them.-The very definition of a perfect right opposed to the offices of humanity, etc., which are by some called imperfect rights, is one which we may compell others to perform to us by violence (LJ(A) v 141-42, 326-27; see also LJ(B) 96,435).
As Madison would later say in F51, Smith's logic here is that "ambition must be made to counter ambition."
Facilitating the Right of Resistance: The Consensus Condition
Citizen coordination is central to understanding both the right of resistance in practice but also how constitutions are sustained. The consensus condition holds that if citizens act in concert to oppose transgressions by political development, they can either force officials to back down or drive them from office (Mittal and Weingast 2011; Weingast 1997) . How is this coordination achieved?
The fundamental citizen coordination problem emphasizes the dilemma facing citizens. People typically have varying experiences, different occupations, and live in different regions. They are likely, therefore, to place different weights on the importance of various rights and government procedures. Absent a mechanism to facilitate coordination, people's varying views on transgressions imply that they will fail to act in concert. That failure, in turn, allows political officials to abuse the rights of some citizens and survive; hence the phrase, the fundamental citizen coordination problem.
To facilitate the consensus condition, successful constitutions rely on two related mechanisms. First, they construct focal solutions (Schelling 1960) to the fundamental citizen coordination dilemma that create agreement -indeed, consensus -among the people about the nature of transgressions. By defining the rules and ensuring that most people are better off under the rules, focal solutions to the coordination dilemma facilitate the ability of citizens to act in concert. A major purpose of constitutions is to construct these focal solutions (Hardin 1989 and Weingast 2011) .
Second, successful constitutions create brightlines that facilitate the ability of a large and decentralized community of citizens to act in concert by making it easy for people to realize when a transgression has occurred (see Jacobi, Mittal, and Weingast 2015) . Brightlines are constitutional provisions written in a manner so that diverse citizens can come to the same judgment about a constitutional violation independently.
Haakonssen summarizes Smith's logic: "a clear division of power makes it possible for all the actual (and partial) spectators to form a clearer, a more impartial judgement about right and wrong in the exercise of power, than they otherwise would. In other words, the division of power is an institutional device which will tend to make people's opinion of the sovereign power more enlightened" (Haakonssen 1981 :131, emphasis in original).
For example, the right of Habeas Corpus embodies a brightline. It requires that to be held in jail a person must be accused of a crime within forty days of arrest. An official accusation is a public -indeed, common knowledge -signal. A person in a gaol either has or has not been accused within forty days. No middle ground exists. In contrast, this provision would fail to be a brightline if it read that a prisoner be charged within 40 days, subject to "emergencies" declared by the king. Rational people can disagree as to the circumstances that constitute an "emergency," but not about 40 days. Prior to the Habeas Corpus Act, "the Privy Councill could put any one they pleased into prison and detain him at pleasure without bringing him to trial" LJ(A) v.7:272).
Smith continues, suggesting the logic of the incentives underlying the consensus condition about how Habeas Corpus is enforced: "No judge can oppose the Habeas Corpus Act; infamy and a high penalty are the punishment which attend it. No influence of the king could ever induce them to make any such attempt... it will never be allowed to be reppealed, as that would destroy in a great measure the liberty of the subject" (LJ(A) v.8:272-73). Similarly, the independent judiciary came to be sustained by the consensus condition. King James's I fired Chief Justices in the early 17 th century because they would not produce the rulings he desired; these firings were public events. Such predatory mischief induced the participants in the Glorious Revolution to instantiate the independent judiciary as a constitutional provision. Forcing a judge from office thereby became a brightline, common knowledge signal that the king has violated the rules.
The importance of brightlines can be seen by contrasting the above constitutional provision about the independent judiciary with a similar provision that lacks a brightline. To see how this logic unfolds in practice, consider how the legislature serves as a curb on the judiciary. As Haakonssen summarizes, "a completely regular administration of justice is only achieved when the judges' independence of the executive is counterbalanced by their dependence upon rules of law laid down by a legislative power, a tripartite sovereign is necessary to achieve 'perfect security to liberty and property'" (Haakonssen 1981:132, citing LJ(A) v 15, 108-11,313-14; LJ(B) 92-93). Or, in Smith's words, "Here is a happy mixture of all the different forms of government properly restrained and a perfect security to liberty and property" (LJ ( The Bishop of London refused. In reaction, the king, not "pleased with this, recreated a Court of High Commission, which had been long abrogated and discharged ever after to be erected, and summoned both the Bishop and Sharp to appear before it." Smith concludes that "Nothing could more alarm the nation than this attack upon the bishops."
Smith reports that the people, convinced that the king sought to change the country's religion to Catholicism, became alarmed (LJ(B) 97:436).
Smith concludes that: "It was no wonder that by such practices the Revolution was brought about, and the family sett aside, for the whole nation was disposed to favour the Prince of Orange… Thus K. James, on account of his encroachments on the body politic, was with all justice and equity in the world opposed and rejected" (LJ ( Smith's answer, "The central thesis in [Smith's] history of law and government is that wide individual liberty is not even a possibility without strong government." In particular, the government must be sufficiently strong to police itself from initiating constitutional transgressions.
By way of summary, Smith's constitutional theory focuses on two interlocking features; a set of prescriptions centered on the separation of powers system; and a set of incentives to monitor and police those prescriptions. Each of the components of the separation of powers has incentives to monitor and police each other. The consensus condition underlies this mechanism in combination with citizens' right of resistance in the face of constitutional violations. In focusing on these problems, Smith's approach fits comfortably in the modern literature of the political-economics of development.
